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Abstract. We document that monetary policy inertia can help alleviate
problems of indeterminacy and non-existence of stationary equilibrium observed for
some commonly-studied monetary policy rules. We also find that inertia promotes
learnability of equilibrium. The context is a simple, forward-looking model of the
macroeconomy widely used in the rapidly expanding literature in this area. We con-
clude that this might be an important reason why central banks in the industrialized
economies display considerable inertia when adjusting monetary policy in response
to changing economic conditions.
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1. Monetary policy advice
1.1. Determinacy. A fundamental issue in the evaluation of alternative monetary
policy rules, especially when the structural model has forward-looking elements, is the
question of whether a proposed policy rule is associated with a determinate equilibrium
or not. Starting with the work of Sargent and Wallace (1975), it has been shown that
certain types of policy rules may be associated with very large sets of rational expectations
equilibria (REE) and that some of these equilibria may involve fluctuations in variables
like inflation and real output due solely to self-fulfilling expectations. Such rules and
the associated equilibria arguably ought to be avoided if one wishes to stabilize these
variables.1 Perhaps disconcertingly, this problem appears to be particularly acute for
policy rules which may otherwise seem to be fairly realistic in terms of actual central bank
behavior. For example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) have provided evidence which
suggests that monetary policy for the major industrialized countries since 1979 has been
forward-looking: Nominal interest rates are adjusted in response to anticipated inflation.
This empirical finding is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that such forward-looking
rules are associated with equilibrium indeterminacy in many models (see, in particular,
Bernanke and Woodford (1997)). Similarly, in many models policy rules which call for the
monetary authority to respond aggressively to past values of endogenous variables (such
as the previous quarter’s deviations of inflation from a target level, or the output gap)
can be associated with explosive instability of rational expectations equilibrium. Yet at
the same time, such policy rules might also be thought of as fairly realistic in terms of
actual central bank behavior in some contexts. Thus, at least two empirically relevant and
seemingly ordinary-looking classes of policy rules seem to be associated with important
theoretical problems, problems which might cause one to hesitate before recommending
such rules to policymakers.
Christiano and Gust (1999), among others, have stressed the seriousness of these
theoretical concerns for the design of stabilization policy. Even aside from broad modeling
uncertainty, there is considerable sampling variability about the estimated parameters of a
given model of the macroeconomy. When a candidate class of policy rules may or may not
generate indeterminacy, or explosive instability, depending on the particular parameter
1Some of the authors that discuss this issue most recently include Bernanke and Woodford (1997),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), Christiano and Gust (1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), McCallum
and Nelson (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998, 1999), and Woodford (1999).
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values of the structural model and of the policy rule, it creates something of a minefield
for policy design. One might, for instance, recommend a particular rule on the basis that
it would generate a determinate rational expectations equilibrium, and that the targeted
equilibrium would have desirable properties based on other criteria, such as utility of
the representative household in the model. And yet, in reality, important parameters
may lie (because of sampling variability alone) in a region associated with indeterminacy
of equilibrium, or with explosive instability. Actually implementing the proposed rule
could then lead to disastrous consequences. Thus, from the perspective of the design of
stabilization policy, one would greatly prefer to recommend policy rules such that, even
if the structural parameters actually take on values somewhat diﬀerent from those that
might be estimated, a determinate rational expectations equilibrium is produced.
1.2. Learnability. Even when a determinate equilibrium exists, coordination on that
equilibrium cannot be assured if agents do not possess rational expectations at every point
in time. It therefore seems important to analyze these systems when agents must form
expectations concerning economic events using the actual data produced by the economy.
In general terms, the learning approach admits the possibility that expectations might
not initially be fully rational, and that, if economic agents make forecast errors and try
to correct them over time, the economy may or may not reach the REE asymptotically.
Thus, beyond showing that a particular policy rule reliably induces a determinate REE,
one needs to show the potential for agents to learn that equilibrium (see also Bullard and
Mitra (2002)). In this paper, we assume the agents of the model do not initially have
rational expectations, and that they instead form forecasts by using recursive learning
algorithms–such as recursive least squares–based on the data produced by the economy
itself. We ask whether the agents in such a world can learn the equilibria of the system
induced by diﬀerent classes of monetary policy feedback rules. We use the criterion
of expectational stability (a.k.a. E-stability) to calculate whether rational expectations
equilibria are stable under real time recursive learning dynamics or not. The research
of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Marcet and Sargent (1989) has shown that the
expectational stability of rational expectations equilibrium governs local convergence of
real time recursive learning algorithms in a wide variety of macroeconomic models.
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1.3. The benefits of monetary policy inertia. We conclude that it is important
to recommend to central banks those policy rules which have desirable determinacy and
learnability properties, taking into consideration possible imprecision in the structural
parameters. Our main finding is that a wide variety of monetary policy rules are desirable
in this sense provided the monetary authorities move cautiously in response to unfolding
events. This is true both from the point of view of determinacy and of learnability of
equilibrium. We model this caution, or inertia, on the part of the central bank by allowing
the contemporaneous interest rate to respond to the lagged interest rate in the policy rule.
Inertia is one of the well-documented features of central bank behavior in industrialized
countries: Policymakers show a clear tendency to smooth out changes in nominal interest
rates in response to changes in economic conditions. Rudebusch (1995) has provided
one statistical analysis of this fact. More casually, actual policy moves are discussed
among central bankers and in the business press in industrialized countries as occurring
as sequences of adjustments in nominal interest rates in the same direction. This is so
much the case, in fact, that policy inertia has been the source of criticism of the eﬀorts of
central bankers, as suggestions are sometimes made that policymakers have been unwilling
to move far enough or fast enough to respond eﬀectively to incoming information about
the economy.
Our study provides analytical support for monetary policy inertia on equilibrium de-
terminacy and learnability in the context of a standard, small, forward-looking model
which is currently the workhorse for the study of monetary policy rules. More specifically,
we consider two variants of monetary policy feedback rules made famous by the seminal
work of Taylor (1993, 1999a, 1999b). In one case, the central bank is viewed as adjusting
a short-term nominal interest rate in response to deviations of past values of inflation and
output from some target levels and, in order to capture interest rate smoothing, we also
include a response to the deviation of the lagged interest rate from some target level. We
call this the lagged data specification. Our second specification calls for the policymakers
to react to forecasts of inflation deviations and the output gap, in addition to the lagged
interest rate, and we call this the forward-looking specification.2
In previous studies it has been observed that there are important determinacy prob-
lems with both of these rules in the absence of inertia (see Bernanke and Woodford (1997),
2We consider only these two classes of rules due to space constraints. We do discuss the robustness of
our results to a wider class of rules when appropriate.
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Bullard and Mitra (2002), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)). We find that by plac-
ing a suﬃciently large weight on lagged interest rate deviations in each of these classes of
policy rules, the policy authorities can mitigate the threats of indeterminacy or explosive
instability, and that this is one of the primary benefits of monetary policy inertia. We
also argue that policy inertia actually promotes learnability of rational expectations equi-
librium. Our contribution is to provide analytical results to this eﬀect and to highlight
some of the intuition behind them.
Combining our results on determinacy and learnability with the Christiano-Gust cau-
tion leads us to recommend inertial policy rules as the most promising from the perspective
of both generating determinacy and learnability of a rational expectations equilibrium.
1.4. Recent related literature. One could interpret our findings as a theory of
why monetary policy inertia is observed in industrialized economies. In particular, our
results suggest why other, non-inertial types of policies might leave the economy vulnerable
to unexpected dynamics, and hence why central banks might willingly adopt inertial
behavior. Recently, several very diﬀerent theories have been proposed as to why policy
inertia might be observed, for instance Woodford (1999), Caplin and Leahy (1996), and
Sack (1998). Our results are probably best viewed as complementary to these theories.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) study the determinacy and learnability of simple monetary
policy rules, that is, of policy rules which only respond to inflation and output deviations,
but not to lagged interest rate deviations, and so do not comment on the question of
monetary policy inertia. Evans and Honkapohja (2002a) analyze learnability in a simi-
lar model, and consider diﬀerent ways of implementing optimal monetary policy under
discretion, which leads to non-inertial rules.
We observe that the finding that interest-rate inertia is conducive to the existence
of determinate REE has already been noted in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and
Woodford (2000). Our contribution on the determinacy front is to elaborate in greater
detail the reasons for the numerical findings in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and to
show that the beneficial eﬀects of inertia are true for a wider class of policy rules than
considered in Woodford (2000). In addition, our results on determinacy are also somewhat
helpful in understanding the eﬀects of inertia on learning dynamics.
With regard to the recent empirical literature concerning policy rules, our results are
comforting since actual interest rates are often modeled by a reaction rule where the
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change in the funds rate responds to deviations of inflation and output from their typical
values (for an example in the U.S. case see Fuhrer and Moore (1995a)). This means that
the coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate in the policy rule is unity. The same type of
policy rules are also found to have desirable properties in terms of low output and inflation
volatility across four diﬀerent structural macroeconometric models of the U.S. economy
in the study of Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999).
1.5. Organization. In the next section we present the model analyzed throughout
the paper. We also discuss the types of linear policy feedback rules we will use to organize
our analysis, and a calibrated case which we will occasionally employ. In the subsequent
sections, we present conditions for determinacy of equilibrium for the lagged policy rule.
The conditions for determinacy of the forward rule are relegated to the appendix since,
as mentioned before, conditions similar in flavor have been noted in the literature. We
then turn to the question of learnability of REE under our various specifications. Section
5 discusses briefly the validity of the results in an extension of the basic model which
incorporates important backward looking elements. We conclude with a summary of our
findings.
2. Environment
2.1. The model. We study a simple forward-looking macroeconomic model developed
by Woodford (1999) which we write as3
xt = Eˆtxt+1 − σ
³
rt − rnt − Eˆtπt+1
´
(1)
πt = κxt + βEˆtπt+1 (2)
where xt is the output gap, πt is the period t inflation rate defined as the percentage
change in the price level from t − 1 to t, and rt is the nominal interest rate; each of the
two latter variables are expressed as a deviation from the long run level. Since we will also
analyze learning we use the notation Eˆtπt+1 and Eˆtxt+1 to denote the possibly nonrational
private sector expectations of inflation and output gap next period, respectively, whereas
the same notation without the hat symbol will denote rational expectations (RE) values.
In the literature, equation (1) is sometimes called the intertemporal IS equation
whereas equation (2) is sometimes called the aggregate supply equation or the new Phillips
3See Woodford (1996) for the nonlinear model and its log-linearized version.
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curve. Equations (1) and (2) are obviously valid under rational expectations (RE) but
here we assume them to be valid even when expectations of agents are not necessarily
rational. We refer the reader to Honkapohja, Mitra, and Evans (2002) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2002b) for a discussion of the assumptions required for this to be true.
Briefly, this derivation is based on individual Euler equations under (identical) subjective
expectations of the agents. We consider this kind of behavior boundedly rational but
reasonable since agents attempt to optimize between the current and next period via the
Euler equation.4
The parameters σ, κ, and β ∈ (0, 1) are structural and assumed positive on economic
grounds; see Woodford (1999) for an interpretation of these constants. The “natural rate
of interest” rnt is an exogenous stochastic term that follows the process
rnt = ρr
n
t−1 + t (3)
where t is iid noise with variance σ2 , and 0 ≤ ρ < 1 is a serial correlation parameter.
2.2. Alternative policy rules. We close the system by supplementing equations
(1), (2), and (3), which represent the behavior of the private sector, with a policy rule
for setting the nominal interest rate representing the behavior of the monetary authority.
We stress that we view identification of classes of rules that reliably produce determinacy
and learnability as a prior exercise to locating an optimal rule according to some objective
function assigned to the central bank. Once we isolate the characteristics of rules that
reliably produce both determinacy and learnability, then one could go about finding an
optimal or best-performing rule from among the ones in this set.
Taylor (1993, 1999a) popularized the use of interest rate feedback rules that react to
information on output and inflation. Our first specification considers a case in which
interest rates are adjusted in response to last quarter’s observations on inflation and the
output gap. This is our lagged data specification for our interest rate equation:
rt = ϕππt−1 + ϕxxt−1 + ϕrrt−1. (4)
This specification is considered operational by McCallum (1999) since it does not call for
the central bank to react to contemporaneous data on output and inflation deviations.
4Recently, Preston (2002) has proposed an alternative formulation of learning in which infinite horizons
matter for individual behavior.
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Our second specification assumes that the authorities set their interest rate instrument
in response to their forecasts of output gap and inflation, so that the policy rule itself
is forward-looking. Forward-looking rules have been found to describe well the actual
behavior of monetary policymakers in countries like Germany, Japan, and the U.S. since
1979, as documented by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998). We consider a simple version
of this rule, namely5
rt = ϕπEˆtπt+1 + ϕxEˆtxt+1 + ϕrrt−1. (5)
In the next section, we consider the determinacy of REE, and then we follow that with a
section analyzing the learnability of equilibrium. We maintain the following assumptions
throughout the paper: ϕπ ≥ 0 and ϕx ≥ 0, with at least one strictly positive, ϕr > 0,
κ > 0, σ > 0, and 0 < β < 1. We sometimes illustrate our findings using a standard
calibration of this model for which we use Woodford’s (1999) calibrated values, namely,
β = .99, σ−1 = .157, κ = .024, and ρ = .35.
3. Inertia and determinacy
3.1. Lagged data in the policy rule. We start by considering the system when
the policymaker reacts to lagged values of inflation, output, and interest rate deviations.
Non-inertial lagged data rules (i.e., rules with ϕr = 0) can easily lead to non-existence
of locally unique stationary solutions. Indeed, Bullard and Mitra (2002) note that a
suﬃciently aggressive response to inflation and output deviations invariably leads to such
a situation in quantitatively important portions of the parameter space.6 We now show
that this problem need not arise if the central bank displays suﬃcient inertia in setting
its interest rate.
In this case, our policy rule is given by equation (4), so that the complete system is
given by equations (1), (2), (3), and (4). If yt = (xt, πt, rt)0, then this system can be put
5Similar interest rate rules also arise in the context of implementing optimal discretionary monetary
policies and nominal GDP targeting, see respectively Evans and Honkapohja (2000) and Mitra (2001). One
interpretation for this rule is that both policymakers and private agents have homogeneous expectations
and learning algorithms. Alternately, it may be that the central bank simply targets the predictions of
private sector forecasters. However, one can allow for some forms of heterogeneity in learning rules, see
Honkapohja and Mitra (2001a, 2001b).
6The interested reader can consult Figure 2 in that paper, or similarly Figure 2.15 of Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999).
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in the form
Eˆtyt+1 = B1yt + ςrnt , (6)
B1 =


1 + β−1κσ −β−1σ σ
−β−1κ β−1 0
ϕx ϕπ ϕr

 . (7)
Determinacy depends on the eigenvalues of B1: Since rt is pre-determined and xt, πt are
free, equilibrium is determinate if and only exactly one eigenvalue of B1 is inside the unit
circle.7
Woodford (2000) provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy of such
a system. Proposition 2 in the appendix of Woodford (2000) lists three possible sets
of conditions in terms of the characteristic polynomial of B1 under which determinacy
obtains. Specifically, he shows that a 3 × 3 matrix has exactly one eigenvalue inside the
unit circle and the remaining two outside if and only if one of three cases holds. The
cases are labelled I, II, and III. We now apply these conditions to B1. The details of these
calculations are given in Appendix A.
The following two conditions are necessary for both Cases II and III in Woodford
(2000) which also rule out Case I:
κ(ϕπ + ϕr − 1) + (1− β)ϕx > 0, (8)
[κσ + 2(1 + β)]ϕr + 2(1 + β) > σ[κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx]. (9)
The condition (8) is precisely what Woodford (2000) calls the Taylor principle, whereby
in the event of a permanent one percent rise in inflation, the cumulative increase in the
nominal interest rate is more than one percent. However, the Taylor principle in general
does not suﬃce for determinacy. Another necessary condition for determinacy is condition
(9). This proves the following result:
Proposition 1. Assume that κ(ϕπ+ϕr− 1)+ (1−β)ϕx > 0 for the inertial lagged data
interest rule (4). Then a necessary condition for determinacy is
[κσ + 2(1 + β)]ϕr + 2(1 + β) > σ[κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx]. (10)
This proposition shows that the Taylor principle is not suﬃcient for determinacy: It is
also necessary that the degree of inertia ϕr be large enough. If the central bank responds
7Our determinacy analysis follows conventional practice, see Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
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vigorously to inflation and output without displaying enough inertia, then the condition
for determinacy may be violated.
The conditions required for Case III in Woodford (2000) reduce to (8), (9), and8
ϕr > 2− (1 + κσ)β−1. (11)
The right hand expression in (11) is less than 1 since κ > 0, σ > 0, and 0 < β < 1.
These conditions show that a large enough value of ϕr will always result in determinacy
since this contributes to satisfaction of all of the conditions (8), (9), and (11) required for
determinacy by Case III. A value of ϕr ≥ 1 always satisfies (8) (and hence rules out Case
I) and (11), so that if ϕr also satisfies condition (9), the conditions for determinacy will
be met. Using Proposition 1 proves:
Proposition 2. Assume that ϕr ≥ 1 for the inertial lagged data interest rule (4). Then
the necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy is
[κσ + 2(1 + β)]ϕr + 2(1 + β) > σ[κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx]. (12)
The analytical results given above provide intuition for a number of results obtained in
more complicated forward-looking models. For instance, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
found that large values of ϕr tend to be associated with a unique equilibrium. This is
easily explained by conditions (8), (9), and (11) which are suﬃcient for a determinate
outcome. Values of ϕr ≥ 1 automatically satisfy condition (8), and condition (11) along
with small values of κ, such as the one employed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999),
help to satisfy condition (9) easily and create a relatively large region of determinate
equilibria.
Similarly, we can also provide intuition for the finding in McCallum and Nelson (1999,
pp. 34-35) that interest rules with large values of ϕπ or ϕx deliver dynamically stable (in
their terminology) results, so long as there is a suﬃcient level of policy inertia. Their
first explanation for this surprising finding can be understood from our condition (9).
Relatively small values of σ and κ means that condition (9) is likely to be easily satisfied.
The intuition of McCallum and Nelson (1999) is, therefore, verified here to this extent:
Small values of these two parameters, which are crucial for the transmission of policy
8The necessary and suﬃcient conditions required for Case II are (8), (9), and another (complicated)
condition which is not reproduced here.
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actions to inflation, reduce the possibility of non-existence of any stationary solution. But
in fact we can go further. Conditions (8), (9), and (11) demonstrate that for any admissible
values of structural parameters, if policy is suﬃciently inertial then the associated REE
will always be determinate.9
3.2. Summary of the results on determinacy. The beneficial eﬀects of a large
degree of inertia on determinacy extend to the forward looking rule, (5), see Appendix B
for the details. In addition, they also extend to other rules not considered here. Woodford
(2000) has shown that for rules responding to contemporaneous values of inflation, out-
put and the lagged interest rate, determinacy is completely characterized by the Taylor
principle. The Taylor principle also characterizes determinacy for rules responding to con-
temporaneous expectations of inflation, output, and the lagged interest rate, examined in
Bullard and Mitra (2002). In other words, a high degree of inertia promotes determinacy
for a wide variety of rules considered in the literature. Note that the same cannot be
said for the response to inflation and output in the interest rule- a response which is too
aggressive to these parameters may lead to problems of non-existence of stationary REE
or indeterminacy.
The tendency of policy inertia to help generate determinacy may be an important
reason why so much inertia is observed in the actual monetary policies of industrialized
countries. However, too much policy inertia may cause another type of instability–that
of the learning dynamics. We now turn to this topic.
4. Inertia and learnability
4.1. Lagged data in the policy rule.
The system under learning. We now consider learning, beginning with the case
in which the policy authority responds to lagged data.10 In this case, the complete
system is given by equations (1), (2), (3), and (4). We analyze the expectational stability
of stationary minimum state variable (MSV) solutions (see McCallum (1983)). For the
analysis of learning, we need to compute the MSV solution and for this we need to
obtain a relationship between the current endogenous variables (and their lags) and future
expectations. This relationship is now obtained by first defining the vector of endogenous
9Propositions 1 and 2 may give the impression that the Taylor principle is necessary for determinacy.
However, this is not true, see Proposition 9 in Appendix A.
10Our analysis of learning is standard and follows Evans and Honkapohja (2001), ch. 10.
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variables, yt = (xt, πt, rt)0, and by putting our system in the form yt = ΩEˆtyt+1+δyt−1+
κrnt where Ω and δ are given by
Ω =


1 σ 0
κ β + κσ 0
0 0 0

 , (13)
δ =


−σϕx −σϕπ −σϕr
−κσϕx −κσϕπ −κσϕr
ϕx ϕπ ϕr

 . (14)
The MSV solution for this model takes the form
yt = a¯+ b¯yt−1 + c¯rnt (15)
with a¯ = 0, and with b¯ and c¯ given by
b¯ = (I − Ωb¯)−1δ, (16)
c¯ = (I − Ωb¯)−1(κ + ρΩc¯), (17)
provided the matrix (I − Ωb¯) is invertible. Equation (16) potentially yields multiple
solutions for b¯ and the determinate case corresponds to the situation when there is a
unique solution for b¯ with all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. For the analysis of learning,
we assume that agents have a perceived law of motion (PLM) of the form
yt = a+ byt−1 + crnt (18)
corresponding to the MSV solution. We then compute the following expectation (assuming
that the time t information set does not include yt)11
Eˆtyt+1 = a+ bEˆtyt + cρr
n
t = (I + b)a+ b
2yt−1 + (bc+ cρ)r
n
t . (19)
Inserting the above computed expectations into the actual model one obtains the following
actual law of motion (ALM) of yt
yt = (Ω+Ωb)a+ (Ωb2 + δ)yt−1 + (Ωbc+Ωcρ+ κ)rnt . (20)
11We assume that the private sector only has access to information on the previous period’s values of
output, inflation and interest rate in forming its forecasts. We believe this assumption to be realistic since
contemporaneous values of these variables are rarely available in practice. We also assume that the agents
use information on the contemporaneous natural interest rate, rnt , in forming their forecasts; however, we
stress that the results on E -stability are unaﬀected even if we assume that the agents only observe the
last period natural interest rate in forming their forecasts.
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The mapping from the PLM to the ALM takes the form
T (a, b, c) = ((Ω+Ωb)a, Ωb2 + δ, Ωbc+Ωcρ+ κ). (21)
Expectational stability is then determined by the matrix diﬀerential equation
d
dτ
(a, b, c) = T (a, b, c)− (a, b, c) . (22)
The fixed points of equation (22) give us the MSV solution (a¯, b¯, c¯). We say that a
particular MSV solution (a¯, b¯, c¯) is expectationally stable if the MSV fixed point of the
diﬀerential equation (22) is locally asymptotically stable at that point. Our system is in a
form where we can apply the results of Evans and Honkapohja (2001, ch. 10). It can then
be shown that for E -stability of any MSV solution, assuming that the time t information
set is (1, y0t−1, r
n
t )
0, the eigenvalues of the following three matrices:
b¯0 ⊗ Ω+ I ⊗ Ωb¯− I, (23)
ρΩ+ Ωb¯− I, (24)
Ω+Ωb¯− I, (25)
need to have negative real parts (I denotes the identity matrix). If any eigenvalue of
the above matrices has a positive real part, then the MSV solution is not E -stable, and
cannot be learned by boundedly rational agents using recursive least squares. Note that
the MSV solution for b¯ directly aﬀects the E -stability conditions and this is the key to
understanding the results under learning.
A quantitative case. We illustrate regions of determinacy and E -stability for the
case when the policy authorities react to lagged data in Figure 1 where we have employed
the baseline parameter values. Figure 1 contains three panels, the first of which corre-
sponds to the case where there is no policy inertia, so that ϕr = 0. The figure is drawn in
(ϕπ, ϕx) space, holding all other parameters at their baseline values. Vertical lines in the
figure denote parameter combinations that generate determinacy, and that also generate
local stability in the learning dynamics. Horizontal lines, on the other hand, indicate
parameter combinations that generate determinacy, but where the unique equilibrium is
unstable in the learning dynamics. In this and all figures, the blank region is not asso-
ciated with determinacy. The ϕr = 0 portion of this figure illustrates that determinacy
does not always imply learnability. It also illustrates that Taylor-type rules which react
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Figure 1: With ϕr = 0, the region of the parameter space associated with both determinate and
learnable rational exepectations equilibria involves relatively small values for ϕx, and generally
ϕπ > 1. In the blank region, determinacy does not hold. When ϕr = .65, which is close to
empirical estimates in the literature, the region of the parameter space associated with determi-
nacy and learnability expands, relative to the no inertia case. For a large value of ϕr, such as
ϕr = 5 as shown here, much of the pictured (ϕπ, ϕx) space is associated with both determinacy
and learnability.
aggressively to inflation but with little or no reaction to other variables (like the output
gap or the lagged interest rate) tend to be associated with both determinacy and learn-
ability. However, one judgement concerning this panel might be that of Christiano and
Gust (1999), since parameter values within an empirically relevant range are sometimes
associated with equilibria which are not determinate, or which are determinate but not
learnable.
The second panel of Figure 1 illustrates how the situation is improved when the degree
of monetary policy inertia is increased from zero to ϕr = .65. This value is close to
estimates of the degree of policy inertia based on U.S. postwar data. In this case, the region
of the (ϕπ, ϕx) space associated with both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium
has been enlarged. The region associated with determinate, but unlearnable, rational
expectations equilibria has been eliminated. This eﬀect becomes even more pronounced
in the third panel, where a very large value of ϕr is employed, specifically, ϕr = 5. In
this case, a much larger portion of the space is determinate and learnable. Thus, we see
that larger degrees of policy inertia enhance the prospects for determinacy considerably,
relative to the case where there is no policy inertia at all. In addition, learnability does not
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appear to be jeopardized by large degrees of policy inertia, as the determinate equilibria
are also learnable, even when ϕr is large.
Intuition and analytics. We now provide some intuition and analytics for the
phenomenon illustrated in Figure 1. We first start with a discussion of non-inertial policy
rules when ϕr = 0. The triangular region in the left hand panel of Figure 1 shows
that there are determinate equilibria which are E -unstable in this case. We first provide
intuition for this phenomenon. When ϕr = 0, the reduced form model with the interest
rate rule
rt = ϕππt−1 + ϕxxt−1 (26)
takes the form
yt = ΩEˆtyt+1 + δyt−1 + κrnt , (27)
Ω =
·
1 σ
κ κσ + β
¸
, (28)
δ =
·
−ϕxσ −ϕπσ
−κϕxσ −κϕπσ
¸
, (29)
where yt = [xt, πt]
0. The MSV solution of (27) continues to take the form (15) with the
same solutions for a¯ (= 0), and b¯, c¯ given by (16) and (17). It is the feedback from
lagged endogenous variables (via b¯) in the stationary MSV solution that is the key to
understanding E -instability of determinate equilibria.
In matrix form, the MSV solution for b¯ is of the form
b¯ =
·
bxx bxπ
bπx bππ
¸
, (30)
where bxπ = ϕπϕ
−1
x bxx, bπx = ϕxϕ
−1
π bππ (assuming ϕx, ϕπ > 0), and bxx and bππ can be
computed from equation (16) (see Appendix C for the details). Written explicitly, this
MSV solution takes the form
xt = bxxxt−1 + bxππt−1 + ... (31)
πt = bπxxt−1 + bπππt−1 + ... (32)
Here the three elipses denote terms involving shocks not needed for our analysis. We
conclude that b¯ in (30) is singular, and that |bxx + bππ| < 1 is required for stationarity of
the MSV solution b¯. Explicit analytical expressions for bxx and bππ are not obtainable.
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To examine what type of MSV solutions can be E -stable, we first note that a necessary
condition for E -stability is that the eigenvalues of Ω+Ωb¯− I have negative real parts and
for this, the determinant of Ω+Ωb¯− I, given by
−bxx(1− β + κϕπϕ−1x )− bππ(κ+ ϕxϕ−1π )σ − κσ, (33)
must be positive. Hence, it is necessary that at least one of bxx or bππ be negative for
E -stability since otherwise this determinant will be negative. In other words, if both bxx
and bππ are positive (implying that bxπ and bπx are also positive), the MSV solution will
necessarily be E-unstable.
In fact, this is precisely what happens in the triangular determinate but E -unstable
region of Figure 1. As mentioned in Section 3.1, this region corresponds to the violation of
the Taylor principle and the necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy in this case
is given by condition (70) in Proposition 9 (with ϕr = 0 here). However, Proposition 9
does not tell us anything about the properties of this determinate solution which is crucial
for E -stability. In fact it can be easily checked that the unique stationary solution for b¯ in
this region involves both bxx > 0 and bππ > 0 which makes this solution E -unstable. As
long as ϕr = 0 (or small), the existence of a determinate equilibrium does not preclude a
solution for b¯ with both bxx and bππ positive.
The economic interpretation of this result is as follows. Since bxx, bππ, bxπ, and bπx
are all positive, the MSV solution (31)-(32) in this region has a perverse feature in the
sense that an increase in either lagged output or inflation raises the nominal interest rate
but not by enough (i.e., the real interest rate falls) so that this increases current output
and inflation which further enhances these inflationary pressures if one starts outside
the REE. If agents actually do have rational expectations (RE), then their beliefs will
exactly match realizations and, furthermore, this equilibrium will be the unique one in
this parameter range. When agents do not have RE to start with, then there will be
pressure to move further away from these determinate REE owing to the perverse nature
of the solution.
The (vertical) determinate and E -stable region when ϕr = 0, on the other hand,
satisfies the Taylor principle and it can be checked numerically that these are characterized
by MSV solutions where bxx, bππ(and hence bxπ, bπx) are all negative. In these solutions,
an increase in either lagged output or inflation increases the nominal and real interest rate
so that contemporaneous output and inflation fall pushing the economy back towards the
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initial equilibrium even when agents start outside the REE and are learning using recursive
least squares.
We note that the same phenomenon exists qualitatively for small values of ϕr. With a
low degree of inertia in the policy rule, a (triangular) region of determinate but E -unstable
equilibria continues to exist for precisely the same reason outlined above. However, the
size of this triangular determinate region shrinks as the degree of inertia increases and is
eventually eliminated.
When the policy rule involves ϕr > 0, the MSV solution b¯ takes the form (see Appendix
D)
b¯ =


bxx bxπ bxr
bπx bππ bπr
ϕx ϕπ ϕr

 (34)
with bxx = ϕxϕ
−1
r bxr, bxπ = ϕπϕ
−1
r bxr, bπx = ϕxϕ
−1
r bπr, and bππ = ϕπϕ
−1
r bπr. Conse-
quently, once bxr and bπr are known, the remaining unknowns can be easily determined
from them. However, the two equations for determining bxr and bπr are nonlinear (see
equations (78) and (79) in Appendix D) and analytical expressions are not obtainable.
Written explicitly the MSV solution is of the form
xt = bxxxt−1 + bxππt−1 + bxrrt−1 + ... (35)
πt = bπxxt−1 + bπππt−1 + bπrrt−1 + ... (36)
and the solution for the interest rule (in the MSV solution) is the same as (4).
It is easy to check that two of the eigenvalues of b¯ in (34) at the MSV solution are
zero and the third one is given by ϕr + ϕxϕ
−1
r bxr + ϕπϕ
−1
r bπr. A stationary solution for
b¯ is, therefore, equivalent to the requirement that
−(1 + ϕr)ϕr < ϕxbxr + ϕπbπr < (1− ϕr)ϕr. (37)
Without any further calculations, the right hand inequality in (37) immediately demon-
strates that if ϕr ≥ 1, a necessary condition for stationarity is that at least one of bxr or
bπr (i.e., bxx or bππ) be negative. We state this result as a proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume that ϕr ≥ 1. A necessary condition for an MSV solution with
the lagged data interest rule (4) to be stationary is that either of the following conditions
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holds.
bxx < 0, bxπ < 0, and bxr < 0, (38)
bππ < 0, bπx < 0, and bπr < 0. (39)
In other words, a high degree of inertia precludes a stationary MSV solution with both
bxr and bπr positive. Furthermore, analysis of (37) also shows that the same reasoning need
not apply for small values of ϕr. In particular, with ϕr small, a determinate equilibrium
with positive values of both bxr and bπr can satisfy (37) and indeed such equilibria do
exist. However, we show below that all such solutions continue to be E -unstable as in the
non-inertial case.
We now turn to a discussion of E -stability of the MSV solution when ϕr > 0. Appendix
E provides the details behind the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E -stability. It is
shown there that a necessary condition for Ω+ Ωb¯− I to have eigenvalues with negative
real parts (i.e., for E -stability) is that a2 defined as
a2 = −[(1− β)ϕx + κϕπ]ϕ−1r bxr − σ(ϕx + κϕπ)ϕ−1r bπr − κσ (40)
be positive. This implies that at least one of bxr or bπr must be negative for E -stability.
This proves:
Proposition 4. A necessary condition for an MSV solution with the lagged data interest
rule (4) to be E-stable is that either of the following conditions holds.
bxx < 0, bxπ < 0, and bxr < 0, (41)
bππ < 0, bπx < 0, and bπr < 0. (42)
Proposition 4 shows that any MSV solution with both bxr and bπr positive is necessarily
E -unstable regardless of the degree of inertia in the policy rule. The intuition here is the
same as in the case of the non-inertial rule. E -stability rules out a perverse (positive)
eﬀect of the lagged interest rate on contemporaneous output and inflation in the MSV
solution, something which the criterion of determinacy per se does not. In particular, a
necessary condition for E -stability is that an increase in the lagged interest rate results
in a increase in current output or inflation in the MSV solution (35)-(36).
Proposition 3 showed that (only) a high degree of inertia ruled out precisely the same
types of stationary MSV solutions (i.e., with bxr > 0 and bπr > 0) which are always
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E -unstable by Proposition 4. In other words, with a high degree of inertia, the necessary
conditions for both determinacy and E -stability coincide; compare Propositions 3 and 4.
In fact, one can check numerically that super-inertial rules (i.e, rules with ϕr ≥ 1) lead
to determinate MSV solutions with both bxr and bπr negative.12 Appendix E shows that if
the degree of inertia is large enough, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for E -stability
in this case simplifies to the one given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Assume that ϕr ≥ 1 for the lagged interest rule (4) and consider a
stationary MSV solution (i.e., one satisfying (37)) with bxr < 0 and bπr < 0. Let σϕx +
(β + κσ − 1)ϕπ ≥ 0 and
ϕ+r ≡ 2−1β−1[1 + β + κσ +
p
(1 + β + κσ)2 − 4β] > 1. (43)
Then if ϕr ≥Max{β+κσ, ϕ+r }, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for E-stability is13
−[(1− β)ϕx + κϕπ]ϕ−1r bxr − σ(ϕx + κϕπ)ϕ−1r bπr > κσ. (44)
Obviously, bxr < 0 and bπr < 0 per se do not suﬃce for condition (44) to be satisfied–
they must be large enough for this. As it turns out, numerically, the determinate MSV
solutions with super-inertial rules satisfy condition (44) and all such solutions are E -
stable. Herein lies the intuition behind the E -stability of MSV solutions associated with
super-inertial rules. However, if ϕr is small, a determinate equilibrium with bxr > 0 and
bπr > 0 (and hence bxx, bxπ, bππ, bπx all > 0) exist and all such solutions are E -unstable by
Proposition 4–this explains the triangular region of determinate but E -unstable equilibria
for low degrees of inertia.
4.2. Forward expectations in the policy rule.
The system under learning. With forward expectations the complete system is
given by equations (1), (2), (3), and (5). We analyze E -stability of the MSV solution.
After defining the vector of endogenous variables, yt = (xt, πt, rt)0, we put our system in
the form
yt = ΩEˆtyt+1 + δyt−1 + κrnt , (45)
12We are unable to prove this result analytically, i.e., that ϕr ≥ 1 implies bxr < 0 and bπr < 0.
However, this can be easily checked numerically for plausible values of parameters (including the baseline
values in Table 1) and is the basis for Proposition 5 below.
13We note that β + κσ > 1, which suﬃces for σϕx + (β + κσ − 1)ϕπ ≥ 0, is generally satisfied for
plausible values of structural parameters since β is close to 1 (including the baseline values). In addition,
for the baseline values, ϕ+r = 1.48. We conjecture that the condition ϕr ≥ Max{β + κσ, ϕ+r } may be
weakened.
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Figure 2: For small values of ϕr, forward-looking policy rules generate determinacy and learn-
ability provided ϕπ > 1 and ϕx is suﬃciently small. For ϕr = .65, a larger region of the
(ϕπ, ϕx) space pictured is associated with both determinacy and learnability. Large values of
ϕr generate relatively large regions of determinacy and learnability in (ϕπ, ϕx) space.
where Ω and δ are given by
Ω =


σ(σ−1 − ϕx) σ(1− ϕπ) 0
κσ(σ−1 − ϕx) σ(κ+ βσ−1 − κϕπ) 0
ϕx ϕπ 0

 , (46)
δ =


0 0 −σϕr
0 0 −κσϕr
0 0 ϕr

 . (47)
The MSV solutions take the same form (15) as in the case of lagged data. The analysis of
learning is also exactly the same as before. Hence, assuming that the time t information
set is (1, y0t−1, r
n
t )
0, E -stability of any MSV solution requires that the eigenvalues of the
matrices (23), (24) and (25) have negative real parts.
A quantitative case. Figure 2 illustrates how, even for this case where the policy-
makers are reacting to expectations of future inflation deviations and output gaps, policy
inertia tends to enhance the prospects for determinacy and learnability of a rational ex-
pectations equilibrium. For low values of ϕr, such as the value ϕr = 0.1 in the first panel,
we again find that active Taylor-type rules with little or no reaction to other variables
are associated with both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium. However, the large
region in the figure which is not associated with determinacy might be enough to limit
recommendations of such rules via arguments such as those of Christiano and Gust (1999).
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The second and third panels of Figure 3 show that increased policy inertia can mitigate
such concerns, creating a larger region of determinacy, and in addition, that in these cases
determinate equilibria are also learnable.
Intuition and analytics. We now provide some intuition and analytics for the
phenomena illustrated in Figure 2. As before, it is the MSV solution for b¯ which is crucial
for E -stability. To gain further understanding, we first explore the type of stationary
solutions permissible. Since it is only the lagged interest rate which appears in the model,
the MSV solutions written explicitly take the form
xt = bxxt−1 + ..., (48)
πt = bππt−1 + ..., (49)
rt = brrt−1 + ..., (50)
where bx, bπ, and br are to be determined by solving the system of equations (16), see
Appendix F for the details. Furthermore, stationarity requires |br| < 1.14 Assuming that
Det[I − Ωb¯] = 1− bxϕx − bπϕπ 6= 0, the solution for br is given by
br = ϕr(1− bxϕx − bπϕπ)−1. (51)
We consider three mutually exclusive cases for stationarity, namely
0 < bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1, (52)
bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1, (53)
bxϕx + bπϕπ < 0. (54)
Under case (52), stationarity is ruled out when ϕr ≥ 1 since br > 1 from (51). Case (53),
i.e., bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1, is permissible only when at least one of bx or bπ is positive (when
ϕx, ϕπ > 0) at the MSV solution. Furthermore, bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1 implies that br < 0 by
(51) and stationarity requires that
bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1 + ϕr. (55)
Note that condition (55) cannot a priori be ruled out for a stationary MSV solution even
when ϕr ≥ 1. The final case, condition (54), is permissible only when at least one of bx
14 In matrix form, the b¯ solution for the forward rule (5) has only zeros in the first two columns and the
third column has bx, bπ, and br , respectively. Hence, two of the eigenvalues of b¯ are 0 and the third is br.
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or bπ is negative at the MSV solution. In addition, bxϕx + bπϕπ < 0 implies that br > 0
from (51) and stationarity is equivalent to the requirement that
bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1− ϕr . (56)
We collect these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Assume that ϕr ≥ 1. The MSV solution, (48)-(50), associated with
the forward looking interest rule (5), is stationary if and only if either of the following
conditions hold.
bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1 + ϕr (which implies br < 0), (57)
bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1− ϕr (which implies br > 0). (58)
In other words, even with a high degree of inertia, a stationary MSV solution is a priori
compatible with either br < 0 or br > 0. Of course, such a stationary MSV solution could
either be in the determinate or indeterminate region of the parameter space. Nevertheless,
as in the case of lagged data, a stationary solution with br < 0 implies a perverse relation
in the sense that a rise in the lagged interest rate reduces the contemporaneous interest
rate and raises the contemporaneous output gap or inflation (since at least one of bx or
bπ must be positive).
We now consider some necessary conditions for an MSV solution to be E -stable and
examine the relationship between E -stability and stationarity. Appendix G proves the
following:
Proposition 7. A necessary condition for E-stability of the MSV solution, (48)-(50),
associated with the forward looking interest rule (5) is that bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1 (which is
equivalent to br > 0).
E -stability, therefore, imposes restrictions on the parameters involved in the MSV
solution, independently of stationarity and the degree of inertia in the policy rule. In par-
ticular, it imposes the restriction that a rise in the lagged interest rate should necessarily
lead to a rise in the current interest rate in the MSV solution. Intuitively, when br > 0,
an (unexpected) rise in inflationary pressures which pushes the economy outside the REE
(even if it started from one) causes the interest rate to rise today which in turn causes
the interest rate to rise tomorrow. This rise creates a downward pressure on aggregate
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demand and inflation reducing the inflationary pressures and pushing the economy back
towards the REE. If instead br < 0, then the rise in the interest rate reduces the rate
tomorrow which in turn increases these inflationary pressures and pushes the economy
further away from the REE. Note that the criterion of stationarity per se does not impose
this restriction (see Proposition 6).
Proposition 7 immediately shows that the stationary MSV solutions possible under
case (53) when bxϕx + bπϕπ > 1 (i.e, br < 0) are always E -unstable. Such solutions do
exist in the indeterminate region of the parameter space as will be shown below. Hence,
the only stationary MSV solutions which can be E -stable when ϕr ≥ 1 are the ones with
br > 0.
To gain further intuition, we consider the case when ϕx = 0 in some detail. When
ϕx = 0, the MSV solution(s) for bπ are given by a cubic polynomial given in Appendix
F. It is shown that there exists a negative solution for bπ (i.e., br > 0) which satisfies
(56) when ϕr + ϕπ > 1. Appendix F also shows that if condition (9) in Proposition 11
is violated (with ϕx = 0), then there also exists another stationary solution for bπ with
bπ > 0 (i.e., br < 0) satisfying condition (55). The latter solution is, however, E -unstable
by Proposition 7.
If the solution is determinate under the conditions given in Proposition 11, Appendix F
shows that this uniquely stationary MSV solution involves bπ < 0, bx < 0, and 0 < br < 1.
Super-inertial rules, therefore, cause the determinate REE to have the property that a rise
in the lagged interest rate of one percentage point causes a rise in the current interest rate
of less than one percent, that is, 0 < br < 1. In other words, a high degree of inertia rules
out stationary MSV solutions with br < 0 that are necessarily E-unstable by Proposition
7 and only permits stationary solutions with 0 < br < 1 which can be E-stable.
Appendix G proves E -stability of the determinate MSV solution when ϕr is large
enough. First, we recall Proposition 11 which stated that if ϕr ≥ 1, then condition (9)
is necessary and suﬃcient for determinacy. Appendix G shows that when ϕx = 0, a high
enough degree of inertia always results in E -stability of these determinate solutions. More
specifically, we are able to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Assume that ϕx = 0 and that the conditions in Proposition 11 for de-
terminacy hold i.e., that ϕr ≥ 1 and condition (9) holds for the forward rule (5). Then if
ϕr ≥Max{1, β + κσ}, the determinate equilibria are E-stable.
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The intuition behind this result follows from our discussion. A high degree of inertia
forces the determinate MSV solution to have the property that bπ < 0, bx < 0, and
0 < br < 1 which results in E -stability. The similar intuition is prevalent for arbitrary
values of ϕx. It is easy to check numerically that if the policy rule is super-inertial, then
the determinate solutions involve bπ < 0, bx < 0, and 0 < br < 1 even when ϕx > 0,
which then implies E -stability of the determinate MSV solution.
4.3. Summary of the results under learning and robustness of results. In
Figure 1, we illustrated a situation where a region of the parameter space that generated
determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium failed to generate learnability. Signif-
icantly, that region was associated with violation of the Taylor principle as well as no
inertial element of monetary policy. Rules satisfying the Taylor principle were found to
be associated with expectational stability in Bullard and Mitra (2002). Increasing the de-
gree of monetary policy inertia appears to also be associated with learnability of rational
expectations equilibrium in our setting.
We considered only two types of (albeit plausible) interest rules primarily because of
space constraints. However, similar results extend to other rules not reported here. In
particular, this is true for rules responding to contemporaneous values of inflation, output,
and the lagged interest rate as well as to contemporaneous expectations of inflation and
output and the lagged interest rate- in either case, a high degree of inertia results in
E-stability of the determinate REE .
We have assumed that agents use past data in forming their forecasts when they are
learning. E -stability conditions are in general sensitive to the information agents use in
forming their forecasts, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, ch. 10). If we assume instead
that agents use contemporaneous values of inflation and output in forming their forecasts
(which McCallum would label non-operational, since such information is not normally
available in actual economies), then a high degree of inertia continues to result in E -
stability of the determinate REE. In this sense, results on E -stability of the determinate
equilibria with super-inertial policy rules are robust to the information agents use in their
forecasts.
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Table 1. E-stability of determinate REE
Inflation inertia Output inertia E-stability
χ = .1 θ = .2, .4, .6, .8 Yes in all cases
χ = .2, .4, .6, .8 θ = .1 Yes in all cases
Table 1: E-stability of determinate equilibria under varying degrees of output and inflation
inertia.
5. Endogenous inflation and output persistence
The model given by (1) and (2) is entirely forward looking and as a result it has diﬃculty
capturing the inertia in output and inflation evident in the data, see Fuhrer and Moore
(1995a, 1995b), and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). Consequently, we briefly look at an
extension of this model considered in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Section 6, with
important backward looking elements. The model now consists of the structural equations
xt = −σ
³
rt − rnt − Eˆtπt+1
´
+ (1− θ)Eˆtxt+1 + θxt−1 (59)
πt = κxt + (1− χ)βEˆtπt+1 + χπt−1 (60)
The parameters θ and χ capture the inertia in output and inflation and are assumed to
be between 0 and 1. The shock rnt is still assumed to follow the process (3).
15
We examined numerically the E-stability of determinate solutions for diﬀerent levels of
(inflation and output) inertia for the baseline values of Woodford (1999). For illustrative
purposes, we consider here only the forward looking rule, (5), and report the results in
Table 1. The first row of Table 1 examines the eﬀects of varying degrees of output inertia
with the other parameters set at χ = 0.1, ϕx = 0, ϕπ = 1, and ϕr = 5. The second row,
on the other hand, examines the eﬀects of varying degrees of inflation inertia where we
have also set θ = 0.1, ϕx = 0, ϕπ = 1,and ϕr = 5.
The results demonstrate that a large degree of inertia in the interest rule does not
hamper the E-stability of REE even when the model (realistically) incorporates important
backward looking elements.
6. Conclusion
Two key issues for the evaluation of monetary policy rules are whether they induce a
determinate rational expectations equilibrium or not, and whether that equilibrium is
15Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) have a cost-push shock in the inflation equation (60). However, for
the purpose of our analysis, this does not matter since it leaves the results on determinacy and learnability
unaﬀected.
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learnable or not. We provide analytical results which indicate how an increased degree of
interest rate smoothing can induce both determinacy and learnability of rational expecta-
tions equilibrium over a wide range of feasible parameters. This is true across both of our
specifications of monetary policy rules–a finding which we believe substantially alters
the evaluation of these rules. Consequently, neither of these classes of policy rules–which
might be considered particularly realistic in terms of actual central bank behavior–should
be deemed undesirable on account of determinacy or learnability questions, once policy
inertia is taken into account.
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7. Appendices
7.1. APPENDIX A (Determinacy of Lagged Rule) . The characteristic poly-
nomial of B1 (given in (7)), p(λ), is given by
p(λ) = λ3 +A2λ
2 +A1λ+A0; (61)
A2 = −(1 + β−1 + β−1κσ + ϕr), (62)
A1 = β
−1 + (1 + β−1 + β−1κσ)ϕr − σϕx, (63)
A0 = β
−1σ(κϕπ + ϕx − σ−1ϕr). (64)
Note that p(1) = 1 +A2 +A1 +A0 and p(−1) = −1 +A2 −A1 +A0. We have
p(1) = β−1σ[κ(ϕπ + ϕr − 1) + (1− β)ϕx], (65)
p(−1) = β−1σ[κ(ϕπ − ϕr − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx − 2σ−1(1 + β)(1 + ϕr)]. (66)
Conditions (A.3) and (A.4) in Woodford (2000) can then be seen to correspond to Condi-
tions (8), and (9) respectively in the text. Condition (A.7) corresponds to condition (11)
since
|A2| = 1 + β−1 + β−1κσ + ϕr > 3 (67)
iﬀ condition (11) holds. Conditions (A.1) and (A.2) of Case I correspond to the negation
of (A.3) and (A.4), i.e., conditions (68) and (69).
We now show that the Taylor principle need not even be necessary for determinacy.
For Case I, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy can be expressed as:
κ(ϕπ + ϕr − 1) + (1− β)ϕx < 0, (68)
[κσ + 2(1 + β)]ϕr + 2(1 + β) < σ[κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx]. (69)
Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia 29
Condition (68) corresponds to violation of the Taylor principle. Conditions (68) and (69)
rule out Cases II and III in Woodford (2000). As a result, we have the following.
Proposition 9. Assume that κ(ϕπ+ϕr− 1)+ (1−β)ϕx < 0 for the inertial lagged data
interest rule (4). Then the necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy is
[κσ + 2(1 + β)]ϕr + 2(1 + β) < σ[κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx]. (70)
Note that condition (70) represents violation of condition (10) in Proposition 1. Propo-
sition 9 provides the required conditions for determinacy when the degree of inertia is low.
If ϕr = 0, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy from Proposition 9 is
given by16
(1 + β)−1[κ(1− ϕπ) + 2(1 + β)σ−1] < ϕx < (1− β)−1κ(1− ϕπ). (71)
7.2. APPENDIX B (Determinacy of Forward Rule) . With the forward looking
rule (5), the system can be put in the form (where yt = (xt, πt, rt−1))
Eˆtyt+1 = Byt + ςrnt ; (72)
B = (1− ϕxσ)−1


1− β−1κσ(ϕπ − 1) β−1σ(ϕπ − 1) σϕr
−β−1κ(1− ϕxσ) β−1(1− ϕxσ) 0
ϕx(1 + β
−1κσ)− β−1κϕπ β−1(ϕπ − ϕxσ) ϕr

 .(73)
Since rt−1 is pre-determined and xt, πt are free, equilibrium is determinate if and only if
exactly one eigenvalue of B is inside the unit circle.
As shown in Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Bullard and Mitra (2002), a suﬃ-
ciently aggressive response to inflation or output leads to indeterminacy with the rule (5)
when ϕr = 0. However, we show that this problem can be circumvented by assuming a
suﬃciently aggressive response to the lagged interest rate.17
To economize on space, we state the propostions on determinacy below without proof.
The proofs may be obtained from the authors upon request. The first propostion shows
that if the response to the output gap ϕx is not large, then necessary conditions for
determinacy are given by conditions (8) and (9). More specifically:
16This explains the (triangular) determinate region in the left hand panel of Figure 1 involving values
of ϕπ < 1 which violates the Taylor principle.
17Woodford (2000) has considered the determinacy analysis of a variant of the forward rule where the
interest rate responds to expected inflation and the current output gap. The indeterminacy problems
are much more severe for the rule (5) when ϕr = 0, see Bullard and Mitra (2002). As mentioned before,
similar interest rules also arise in the context of implementing optimal discretionary monetary policies
and nominal GDP targeting, see Evans and Honkapohja (2000) and Mitra (2002).
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Proposition 10. Assume that ϕx < 2σ−1 for the inertial forward looking policy rule (5).
Then conditions (8) and (9) are necessary for determinacy.
This again shows that the Taylor principle in general is not suﬃcient for determinacy;
a high degree of inertia is also necessary. Note that exactly the same conditions (8) and
(9) are necessary for determinacy in the case of rules responding to lagged data; compare
with Proposition 1. In addition, we have
Proposition 11. Assume that ϕr ≥ 1 for the inertial forward looking policy rule (5).
Then the necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy is (9).
The same proposition was proved for rules responding to lagged data; compare with
Proposition 2. These results show that for given values of ϕπ and ϕx, a large enough
value of ϕr invariably leads to uniqueness as in the case of lagged rules.
7.3. APPENDIX C (MSV Solution for Non-Inertial Lagged Rule). In this
case, assuming that D ≡ bxx(1− βbππ) + (β + κσ)bππ + βbxπbπx + κbxπ + σbπx − 1 6= 0,
the MSV parameter values is given by the solution to the following four equations
bxx = [(1− βbππ)σϕx]D−1, (74)
bxπ = [(1− βbππ)σϕπ]D−1, (75)
bπx = [(κ+ βbπx)σϕx]D
−1, (76)
bππ = [(κ+ βbπx)σϕπ]D
−1. (77)
These four equations yield bxπ = ϕπϕ
−1
x bxx, bπx = ϕxϕ
−1
π bππ so that this system can
be reduced to two (nonlinear) equations in two unknowns which can easily be solved
numerically. In general, there are three solutions for b¯ of which exactly one is stationary
in the determinate region.
7.4. APPENDIX D (MSV Solution of Inertial Lagged Rule). We now consider
the situation when ϕr > 0 in the lagged rule. Assuming that I −Ωb¯ is invertible, we need
to solve the system b¯ = (I − Ωb¯)−1δ for the MSV solution, with b¯ a 3× 3 matrix in this
case. Using Mathematica, one can verify that the MSV b¯ solution takes the form given in
(34), with bxx = ϕxϕ
−1
r bxr, bxπ = ϕπϕ
−1
r bxr, bπx = ϕxϕ
−1
r bπr, and bππ = ϕπϕ
−1
r bπr. The
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two (nonlinear) equations for determining bxr and bπr are given by
bxr = ϕr[bxrϕr + σ{bπr(βϕπ + ϕr)− ϕr}]E−1, (78)
bπr = ϕr[κϕr(bxr − σ) + bπr{κσϕr + β(ϕr − σϕx)}]E−1, (79)
E ≡ ϕr − (κϕπ + ϕx)bxr − {βϕπ + σ(κϕπ + ϕx)}bπr. (80)
7.5. APPENDIX E (E-stability of Inertial Lagged Rule). We examine the
conditions for E -stability of the MSV solution.18 We first start with the matrix Ω+Ωb¯−I
which has one eigenvalue of −1 and the remaining two are given by
η2 + ηa1 + a2 = 0, (81)
a1 = 1− β − κσ − ϕ−1r [(ϕx + κϕπ)bxr + {σϕx + (β + κσ)ϕπ}bπr], (82)
a2 = −[(1− β)ϕx + κϕπ]ϕ−1r bxr − σ(ϕx + κϕπ)ϕ−1r bπr − κσ. (83)
Hence, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for Ω + Ωb¯ − I to have eigenvalues with
negative real parts are that a1 > 0 and a2 > 0.
We next look at the 9 × 9 matrix b¯0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ωb¯ − I. Using Mathematica, one can
verify that five of the eigenvalues are −1 and two of the remaining four are given by
ϕ−1r [(ϕx + κϕπ)bxr + {σϕx + (β + κσ)ϕπ}bπr]− 1 = −β − κσ − a1, (84)
where the right-hand equality above uses the expression of a1 from (82). So, a1 > 0
implies that the eigenvalues (84) are negative, as required for E -stability.
The final two eigenvalues of b¯0⊗Ω+I⊗Ωb¯−I are given by the solution of the following
characteristic polynomial
η2 + ηc1 + c2 = 0, (85)
c1 = −ϕ−1r [bxr{(2 + β + κσ)ϕx + κϕπ}+
bπr{σϕx + (1 + 2β + 2κσ)ϕπ}+ ϕr{(1 + β + κσ)ϕr − 2}], (86)
c2 = ϕ
−2
r [2β(ϕxbxr + ϕπbπr)
2 + 3β(ϕxbxr + ϕπbπr)ϕ
2
r +
ϕ2r{βϕ2r − (1 + β + κσ)ϕr + 1}− bxrϕr{κϕπ + (2 + β + κσ)ϕx}
−bπrϕπ(1 + 2β + 2κσ)ϕr − σϕxϕrbπr], (87)
and for E -stability we need c1 > 0 and c2 > 0.
18A Mathematica program which computes these E -stability conditions is provided at
http://www.stls.frb.org/research/econ/bullard/.
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We finally look at the matrix ρΩ+ Ωb¯− I which has one eigenvalue equal to −1 and
the remaining two given by the solutions to
η2 + ηa1ρ + a2ρ = 0, (88)
a1ρ = 2− ρ(1 + β + κσ)− (ϕx + κϕπ)ϕ−1r bxr − (89)
{σϕx + (β + κσ)ϕπ}ϕ−1r bπr
= a1 + (1− ρ)(1 + β + κσ),
a2ρ = (1− ρ)(1− βρ)− ρκσ − {(1− βρ)ϕx + κϕπ}ϕ−1r bxr − (90)
{σ(ϕx + κϕπ) + β(1− ρ)ϕπ}ϕ−1r bπr,
and for E -stability we require both a1ρ > 0 and a2ρ > 0. The right hand equality in (89)
uses the expression for a1 from (82) which, therefore, shows that a1 > 0 implies that
a1ρ > 0 (since 0 < ρ < 1).
In summary, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E -stability given in (23), (24),
and (25), reduce to the coeﬃcients a1, a2, c1, c2, and a2ρ defined in (82), (83), (86), (87),
and (90), respectively, being all positive.
Details for Proposition 5. We first note that
a1 − a2 = 1− β − βϕ−1r (ϕxbxr + ϕπbπr) > 1− β − βϕ−1r (1− ϕr)ϕr (91)
where the right hand inequality in (91) follows from the solution being stationary and
ϕr ≥ 1, i.e., (the right hand inequality in) condition (37). Hence, ϕr ≥ 1 implies that
a1 > a2 from (91) and hence a2 > 0 implies a1 > 0.
Similarly, comparing term by term, it can be checked that a2ρ > a2 since bxr < 0,
bπr < 0 and 0 < ρ < 1. So a2 > 0 also implies that a2ρ > 0.
The required necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E -stability have now reduced to
a2 > 0, c1 > 0, and c2 > 0.
We now examine c2. Since ϕr > 0, the sign of c2 is determined by the expression
within parentheses in (87). The first two terms within this parentheses can be combined
together as
2β(ϕxbxr +ϕπbπr)
2+3β(ϕxbxr +ϕπbπr)ϕ
2
r = β(ϕxbxr +ϕπbπr)[3ϕ
2
r +2(ϕxbxr +ϕπbπr)].
(92)
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We show that the expression (92) is positive since each of the individual terms in paren-
theses on the right hand side of (92) is negative. The first term, β(ϕxbxr+ϕπbπr), in (92)
is negative by condition (37) when ϕr ≥ 1. The second term in (92) is also negative since
ϕxbxr + ϕπbπr < −
3
2
ϕ2r < (1− ϕr)ϕr, (93)
where the final inequality in (93) again uses (37). The inequalities bxr < 0 and bπr < 0
then imply that the final three terms within the parentheses in (87) are positive. Hence,
a suﬃcient condition for c2 > 0 is that g(ϕr) ≡ βϕ2r − (1 + β + κσ)ϕr + 1 ≥ 0. Since
g(0) > 0 and g(1) < 0, g(ϕr) = 0 has two positive roots, one between 0 and 1, and the
other more than 1. The root exceeding one is given by
ϕ+r ≡ 2−1β−1[1 + β + κσ +
p
(1 + β + κσ)2 − 4β]. (94)
In addition, g(ϕr) > 0 for all ϕr > ϕ
+
r since g(∞) = ∞. This proves that c2 > 0 when
ϕr ≥ ϕ+r .
Now c1 > 0 iﬀ the expression within the parentheses in (86) is negative. The first two
terms of this parentheses can be grouped together as
bxr{(2 + β + κσ)ϕx + κϕπ}+ bπr{σϕx + (1 + 2β + 2κσ)ϕπ} (95)
= (2 + β + κσ)(ϕxbxr + ϕπbπr) + (β + κσ − 1)ϕπbπr + σϕxbπr + κϕπbxr
< (2 + β + κσ)(1− ϕr)ϕr + [σϕx + (β + κσ − 1)ϕπ]bπr + κϕπbxr
where the final inequality uses condition (37). Using this we can conclude the following
about the expression within the parentheses of c1
bxr{(2 + β + κσ)ϕx + κϕπ}+ bπr{σϕx + (1 + 2β + 2κσ)ϕπ}+ ϕr{(1 + β + κσ)ϕr − 2}
< (2 + β + κσ)(1− ϕr)ϕr + [σϕx + (β + κσ − 1)ϕπ]bπr + κϕπbxr + ϕr{(1 + β + κσ)ϕr − 2}
= ϕr(β + κσ − ϕr) + [σϕx + (β + κσ − 1)ϕπ]bπr + κϕπbxr. (96)
If σϕx + (β + κσ − 1)ϕπ ≥ 0 and ϕr ≥ β + κσ, then the above expression is negative
provided bxr < 0 and bπr < 0. This proves that c1 > 0. The only remaining condition
required is a2 > 0 which is given in the proposition.
7.6. APPENDIX F (MSV Solution of Forward Rule). We first consider the
nature of the MSV solution. Equations (16) involve three equations in the three unknowns
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bx, bπ, and br. The third equation determines br once bx and bπ are known from the first
two equations. The first two equations (which can be verified using Mathematica) are
(assuming that Det[I − Ωb¯] = 1− bxϕx − bπϕπ 6= 0)
bx = ϕr[bx + (bπ − 1)σ][1− bxϕx − bπϕπ]−1, (97)
bπ = ϕr[κ(bx − σ) + (β + κσ)bπ][1− bxϕx − bπϕπ]−1. (98)
These two equations yield the following simultaneous system in bx and bπ:
ϕxb
2
x + (bπϕπ + ϕr − 1)bx + (bπ − 1)σϕr = 0, (99)
ϕπb
2
π + [bxϕx + (β + κσ)ϕr − 1]bπ + κϕr(bx − σ) = 0. (100)
One can solve for bx in terms of bπ from equation (100) which yields
bx = [κσϕr + {1− (β + κσ)ϕr}bπ − b2πϕπ](κϕr + bπϕx)−1 (101)
and substituting equation (101) into equation (99) yields a (cubic) polynomial in bπ whose
roots yield the MSV solutions for bπ. Once bπ is determined, bx and br can be determined
from it.
Details for the case when ϕx = 0. When ϕx = 0, we substitute (101) into (99)
and the cubic polynomial in bπ simplifies to
p(bπϕπ) ≡ (bπϕπ)3 + (bπϕπ)2d1 + (bπϕπ)d2 + d3 = 0; (102)
d1 = (1 + β + κσ)ϕr − 2,
d2 = 1 + βϕ2r − [1 + β + κσ(ϕπ + 1)]ϕr,
d3 = κσϕπϕr.
The characteristic polynomial, (102), evaluated at bπϕπ = (1− ϕr), yields
p(1− ϕr) = κσϕ2r(ϕr + ϕπ − 1) (103)
so that p(1 − ϕr) > 0 for all ϕr + ϕπ > 1. This means that there exists a negative root
bπ which satisfies (56) since p(−∞) = −∞. If the solution is determinate (say) under the
conditions given in Proposition 11, then this is also the uniquely stationary solution.
The characteristic polynomial, (102), evaluated at bπϕπ = (1+ϕr), on the other hand,
yields
p(1 + ϕr) = ϕ
2
r[{κσ + 2(1 + β)}ϕr + 2(1 + β)− κσ(ϕπ − 1)]. (104)
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From (104), observe that p(1 + ϕr) < 0 when
{κσ + 2(1 + β)}ϕr + 2(1 + β) < κσ(ϕπ − 1), (105)
that is, precisely when condition (9) in Proposition 11 is violated (with ϕx = 0). This
shows that when ϕr + ϕπ > 1 and condition (105) is satisfied, there exist two stationary
solutions for bπ, one with bπ < 0 satisfying condition (56) and the other with bπ > 0
satisfying condition (55).
Note that equation (97) implies that
bx = br[bx + (bπ − 1)σ] (106)
which can be rearranged to give
bx(1− br) = σbr(bπ − 1). (107)
The inequality bπ < 0 implies that
0 < br = ϕr[1− bπϕπ]−1 < 1 (108)
which in turn implies that bx < 0. We note that
bx = σϕr(1− bπ)[bπϕπ + ϕr − 1]−1. (109)
7.7. APPENDIX G (E-stability of Forward Rule). We look at the three pairs
of matrices required for checking E -stability.19 We first start with the 9 × 9 matrix
b¯0 ⊗ Ω+ I ⊗ Ωb¯− I which must have eigenvalues with negative real parts for E -stability.
Using Mathematica, one can verify that five of the eigenvalues are −1 and two of the
remaining four are given by
bxϕx + bπϕπ − 1. (110)
A necessary condition for E -stability is, therefore, bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1 which is equivalent
to br > 0. This proves Proposition 7.
The final two eigenvalues of b¯0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ωb¯ − I are given by the solutions to the
characteristic polynomial
η2 + ηc1 + c2 = 0, (111)
19A Mathematica program which computes these E -stability conditions is provided at
http://www.stls.frb.org/research/econ/bullard/.
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where
c1 = [(1− bxϕx − bπϕπ)2 + (1− bxϕx − bπϕπ)− {1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)− σϕx}ϕr]Xa;
Xa ≡ (1− bxϕx − bπϕπ)−1; (112)
c2 = [(1− bxϕx − bπϕπ)3 + βϕ2r + ϕrXr](1− bxϕx − bπϕπ)−2; (113)
Xr ≡ bπ[bπϕπ(σϕx − ϕπ) + ϕπ{2 + β + κσ(1− ϕπ)− σϕx}− σϕx]
+bx[bxϕx{κϕπ − (β + κσ)ϕx}+ ϕx(1 + 2β + 2κσ − κσϕπ − σϕx)− κϕπ]
+bxbπ[κϕ2π + σϕ
2
x − (1 + β + κσ)ϕxϕπ]− 1− β + κσ(ϕπ − 1)− σϕx(βϕr − 1).
Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the above polynomial to have negative real parts
are that c1 > 0 and c2 > 0.
For E -stability we also need the eigenvalues of Ω+Ωb¯− I to have negative real parts.
One eigenvalue of this matrix is −1 and the remaining two are given by the solutions to
the characteristic polynomial
η2 + ηa1 + a2 = 0; (114)
a1 = (1− bπϕπ − bxϕx)− β + κσ(ϕπ − 1) + σϕx, (115)
a2 = bx[ϕx(β + κσ − 1)− κϕπ]− σϕxbπ (116)
+σ[κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1− β)ϕx].
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the above polynomial to have negative real
parts are that a1 > 0 and a2 > 0.
Finally, one also needs the eigenvalues of ρΩ+Ωb¯− I to have negative real parts. One
eigenvalue of this matrix is −1 and the remaining two are given by the solutions to the
characteristic polynomial
η2 + ηa1ρ + a2ρ = 0; (117)
a1ρ = (2− bπϕπ − bxϕx)− ρ[1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)− σϕx], (118)
a2ρ = 1− ρ[1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)− σϕx] + βρ2(1− σϕx) +
bx[ϕx{ρ(β + κσ)− 1}− ρκϕπ]− bπ[(1− ρ)ϕπ + ρσϕx], (119)
so that for E -stability one requires a1ρ > 0 and a2ρ > 0.
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We conclude that the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E -stability of any MSV
solution in the case of forward rules requires that all of the coeﬃcients c1, c2, a1, a2, a1ρ,
and a2ρ defined in (112), (113), (115), (116), (118), and (119) are positive and that
bxϕx + bπϕπ < 1.
Details for Proposition 8. We consider E -stability of the unique MSV solution
(when ϕx = 0) which exists under the conditions given in Proposition 11, i.e., when ϕr ≥ 1
and condition (9) is satisfied. As proved in Appendix F, this MSV solution has bπ < 0,
bx < 0, 0 < br < 1, and satisfies (56). Note that condition (56) implies that the eigenvalue
(110) is negative.
We first examine the coeﬃcients c1, c2 in (112) and (113) involved in the eigenvalues
of b¯0 ⊗ Ω+ I ⊗ Ωb¯− I. Consider c1 in (112) first. Since bπ < 0, Xa ≡ (1− bπϕπ)−1 > 0,
and E -stability requires the expression in parentheses of c1 to be positive. This expression
simplifies (when ϕx = 0) to
2 + (bπϕπ)
2 − 3bπϕπ − ϕr{1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)}
> 2 + (ϕr − 1)2 + 3(ϕr − 1)− ϕr{1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)}
= ϕ2r + ϕr − ϕr{1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)} = ϕr[ϕr − β + κσ(ϕπ − 1)]. (120)
The first inequality above uses the fact that bπ satisfies (56), i.e., bπϕπ < 1−ϕr. Equation
(120) shows that ϕr ≥ β + κσ suﬃces to make c1 > 0 for all ϕπ > 0.
Next we turn to c2. Since (1 − bπϕπ)−2 > 0 by bπ < 0, E -stability requires the
expression in parentheses of c2 in (113) to be positive. This expression simplifies, after
some manipulation, to (when ϕx = 0)
βϕ2r + (1− bπϕπ)3 + (1− bπϕπ)ϕr[κϕπ(σ − bx) + bπϕπ − (1 + β + κσ)]
= βϕ2r + ϕ
3
rb
−3
r + ϕ
2
rb
−1
r [κϕπ(σ − bx) + bπϕπ − (1 + β + κσ)]
= ϕ2rb
−1
r [(ϕrb
−2
r − β)(1− br) + κσ(ϕπ − 1)− κϕπbx], (121)
where we have used the value of br = ϕr(1−bπϕπ)−1 at the MSV solution from (108) and
eliminated bπϕπ in the final line (121). Obviously, if ϕπ ≥ 1, then c2 > 0 for all ϕr ≥ β
since 0 < br < 1, and bx < 0.
We consider further the situation when ϕπ < 1. For this we substitute the value of bx
from (107) at the MSV solution in the final term of (121), i.e., −κϕπbx, and write this in
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terms of br. Before doing this, we first note from (107) that
bx(1− br) = σbr(bπ − 1) = σbr(ϕ−1π − ϕrϕ−1π b−1r − 1) (122)
= σϕ−1π [br(1− ϕπ)− ϕr],
where we have manipulated br = ϕr(1 − bπϕπ)−1 (obtained from (108)) to get the final
expression on the right hand side above in terms of br. Using (122), we finally obtain
−κϕπbx = κσ(1− br)−1[(ϕπ − 1)br + ϕr]. (123)
Using (123), the expression within parentheses in (121) simplifies to
(ϕrb
−2
r − β)(1− br) + κσ(ϕπ − 1)− κϕπbx (124)
= (ϕrb
−2
r − β)(1− br) + κσ(ϕπ − 1) + κσ(1− br)−1[(ϕπ − 1)br + ϕr]
= ϕr[κσ(1− br)−1 + (1− br)b−2r ] + κσϕπ(1− br)−1 − κσ(1− br)−1 − β(1− br),
where the first two terms in the third line of (124) has grouped together terms involving
ϕr and ϕπ. Then c2 > 0 iﬀ the expression in the third line of (124) is positive. This will
be so iﬀ
ϕr[κσb
2
r + (1− br)2](1− br)−1b−2r > κσ(1− br)−1 − κσϕπ(1− br)−1 + β(1− br), (125)
that is, iﬀ (after multiplying both sides of the above equation by (1− br)),
ϕr[κσb
2
r + (1− br)2]b−2r > κσ(1− ϕπ) + β(1− br)2, (126)
ϕr > [κσb
2
r(1− ϕπ) + βb2r(1− br)2][κσb2r + (1− br)2]−1. (127)
Comparing the terms within the two parentheses in the right hand side of (127), it is easy
to see that this right hand expression in (127) is less than 1 since 0 < β, br < 1 and ϕπ
is assumed to be less than 1. This proves that a suﬃcient condition for c2 > 0, for all
ϕπ > 0, is ϕr ≥ 1.
We next turn to the eigenvalues of Ω+Ωb¯− I which need to have negative real parts.
When ϕx = 0, a1 and a2, defined in (115), and (116), reduce respectively to
a1 = 1− bπϕπ − β + κσ(ϕπ − 1), (128)
a2 = κσ(ϕπ − 1)− κϕπbx. (129)
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We first examine a2. From (129), observe that a2 > 0 when ϕπ ≥ 1 since bx < 0 at the
MSV solution. We now prove that a2 > 0 even when ϕπ < 1. From (129), when ϕπ < 1,
a2 > 0 iﬀ
−κϕπbx > κσ(1− ϕπ), (130)
that is, iﬀ
κσ(1− br)−1[(ϕπ − 1)br + ϕr] > κσ(1− ϕπ), (131)
where we have used (123) in (131). Inequality (131) is equivalent to
(1− br)−1[ϕr(1− ϕπ)−1 − br] > 1. (132)
Since ϕπ < 1 and ϕr ≥ 1, (132) is obviously satisfied and hence, a2 > 0 for all ϕπ > 0.
We next turn to a1. From (128), it is obvious that a1 > 0 when ϕπ ≥ 1 since bπ < 0
at the MSV solution and 0 < β < 1. We now prove that a1 > 0 even when ϕπ < 1. From
(128), when ϕπ < 1, a1 > 0 iﬀ
1− bπϕπ > β + κσ(1− ϕπ), (133)
that is, iﬀ
ϕr > [β + κσ(1− ϕπ)]br (134)
where in moving from (133) to (134), we have used the value of br in (108) above. From
(134), it is clear that since 0 < br < 1, a suﬃcient condition for a1 > 0 for all ϕπ > 0, is
that ϕr ≥ β + κσ.
Finally, we turn to the eigenvalues of ρΩ + Ωb¯ − I which need to have negative real
parts. The coeﬃcient a1ρ, defined in (118), reduces to (when ϕx = 0)
a1ρ = 2− bπϕπ − ρ[1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)] = 2− ρ(1 + β)− bπϕπ + ρκσ(ϕπ − 1) (135)
which is obviously positive when ϕπ ≥ 1 since 0 < β, ρ < 1 and bπ < 0 at the MSV
solution. We now show that a1ρ > 0 when ϕr ≥ β + κσ even when ϕπ < 1. For this note
that we can write a1ρ as
a1ρ = 2− bπϕπ − ρ[1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)] = a1 + (1+ β)(1− ρ)− (1− ρ)κσ(ϕπ − 1) (136)
where we have used the expression of a1 from (128) in the right hand equality of (136).
From (136), it is obvious that since 0 < ρ < 1, a1 > 0 implies that a1ρ > 0 when ϕπ < 1.
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Since it was proved above that a1 > 0 when ϕr ≥ β + κσ, for all ϕπ > 0, it follows,
therefore, that a1ρ > 0 under the same condition.
We now turn to a2ρ, defined in (119), which simplifies (when ϕx = 0) to
a2ρ = 1− ρ[1 + β − κσ(ϕπ − 1)] + βρ2 − ρκϕπbx − (1− ρ)bπϕπ
= (1− ρ)(1− βρ)− (1− ρ)bπϕπ + ρ[κσ(ϕπ − 1)− κϕπbx]
= (1− ρ)(1− βρ)− (1− ρ)bπϕπ + ρa2, (137)
where we have used the value of a2 from (129). Since a2 > 0 was proved before (for all
ϕπ > 0 when ϕr ≥ 1), it follows from (137) that a2ρ > 0 also since 0 < β, ρ < 1, and
bπ < 0.
